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NOTES
FAILURE To FILE TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES:
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
Although an appeal from a criminal conviction is of comparatively recent
origin,' it is presently accepted "as a matter of right" in our criminal pro-
cedure.' This contemporary insistence on the convicted party's right to an
appeal is an expression of society's reluctance to allow the liberty or the life
of the accused to be determined in a single, fallible proceeding. We are hesi-
tant to impose the severe punishment of imprisonment or death until we are
reasonably certain that the conviction is not erroneous. Somewhat inconsistent
with this desire for certainty is the practical and equally important interest in
securing a termination of the litigation.3 We must obtain a finis to the case,
and the ultimate conclusion should be achieved within the shortest time possible.
Lengthy delays, which hamper an adequate review, also erode the efficacy and
the desired goals of our criminal administration.4 Because of the need for a
rapid and final resolution of the case, a limitation on the time within which an
appeal may be taken must be imposed.
Legislatures and courts attempt to balance these dual interests in securing
both justice to the defendant and a quick termination of the case by providing
an adequate time period within which the defendant must note his appeal.
The imposition of a generous time limitation within which an appeal may be
taken protects the defendant's right to appeal while furthering a prompt dis-
position of the controversy.
However, new problems are raised when the defendant, through no. fault
of his own, fails to note his appeal within the time allotted. When this happens,
should the somewhat arbitrary time limitation be rigidly enforced? Would not
a rigorous application of the time limitation, oblivious of the reason for the
defendant's delay, overemphasize the need for finality of judgment and thus
conflict with our notions of fundamental justice? It is the purpose of this note
to examine how the interest in securing a rapid termination of the case can best
be achieved in a manner consonant with our desire to see that fairness has been
accorded to the defendant who, through no fault of his own, has failed to file
a timely appeal.
I. Federal Aspects of the Problem
The taking of criminal appeals in federal courts is governed by rule 37(a)
(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
An appeal by a defendant may be taken within 10 days after entry
of the judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion for a new'trial
1 The Court in Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957), in discussing the
history of criminal appeals, noted that such appeals were not fully available until 1891.
2 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962).
3 See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 441 (1963).
4 Huff v. United States, 192 F.2d 911, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
946 (1952).
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or in arrest of judgment has been made within the 10-day period an
appeal from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days after
entry of the order denying the motion. When a court after trial imposes
sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant
shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk
shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defen-
dant. An appeal by the government when authorized by statute may be
taken within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.5
An analysis of the cases dealing with rule 37, discloses that the federal courts
have attempted to give the rule a broad interpretation, and yet have recognized
that the ten-day limitation is mandatory and an untimely appeal cannot be
heard.'
Certain recent cases indicate that the courts have interpreted the rule
liberally. For example, the rule explicitly states that when the defendant is
not represented by counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to appeal
within the ten-day period. The obvious raison d'etre of this provision has also
served as a basis for holding that when the defendant has a court-appointed
attorney who does not continue to serve in that capacity for the ten-day period
of appeal, the time for appeal does not commence until the defendant is actually
apprised of his right to appeal.' Also, the rule's requirement that an appeal
must be taken within ten days of the entry of an order denying a motion for
a new trial or in arrest of judgment is affected by rule 49(c),' which compels
the clerk to notify the prisoner of the entry of the order.' The time for taking
the appeal originates, then, on the day that the defendant receives the notice,
rather than the date of the entry of the denial, as rule 37(a) (2) seems to
require."
Moreover, the courts have assiduously protected the uninformed defendant
who failed to observe the punctilios for filing the notice of appeal which are
established by rule 37(a)(1)." A letter which intimates a desire to appeal
will suffice even though "it does not comply with all the technical niceties
ordinarily governing a notice of appeal."12 Even a filing of a petition for leave
5 FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2).
6 For a more comprehensive treatment of timely appeals under the Federal Rules see
Note, Timely Appeals and Federal Criminal Procedure, 49 VA. L. REv. 971 (1963).
7 Boruff v. United States, 310 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962).
8 Rosenbloom v. United States, 355 U.S. 80 (1957) (per curiam).
9 FED. R. CGlm. P. 49(c) provides: "Immediately upon the entry of an order made on a
written motion subsequent to arraignment the clerk shall mail to each party affected thereby
a notice thereof and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing."
10 Ching v. United States, 338 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Blunt v. United
States, 244 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1957). However, the negligence of the clerk is inconse-
quential if the defendant had actual notice of the entry. Gonzalez v. United States, 233 F.2d
825 (1st Cir. 1956). More important, the clerk is not required to mail notice of the entry of
judgment. Wilkinson v. United States, 278 F.2d 604 (10th Cir.) (per curiam) cert. denied,
363 U.S. 829 (1960); Hyche v. United States, 278 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960).
11 FED. R. CRiM. P. 37(a)(1) provides in part:
An appeal . .. is taken by filing with the clerk of the district court a notice of
appeal in duplicate .... The notice of appeal shall set forth the title of the case, the
name and address of the appellant and of appellant's attorney, a general statement
of the offense, a concise statement of the judgment or order, giving its date and any
sentence imposed, the place of confinement if the defendant is in custody and a
statement that the appellant appeals from the judgment or order.
12 United States v. Duncan, 310 F.2d 367, 368 (7th Cir. 1962).
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to proceed in forma pauperis is sufficient to constitute the taking of an appeal?"s
Obviously, the defendant will not lose his right to appeal merely because his
notice is mailed to the district judge rather than the clerk, as the rule requires.1 4
The recent Supreme Court holding in Fallen v. United States5 probably
best exemplifies the liberal manner in which, in some instances, the courts have
treated the rule. In Fallen, the indigent defendant's letter, which was written
while he was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary, did not reach the clerk until
fourteen days after his sentencing. Although the envelope was not postmarked,
the letter was dated by the defendant as having been written on the eighth day
after sentencing and the government was unable to provide any evidence that
he had not in fact entrusted the letter to the prison authorities on that day. In
the ordinary course of mail delivery, a letter written eight days after sentencing
would have reached the clerk within the prescribed ten days. In view of this
situation, the Court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal'6 and held that rule
37 did not bar the appeal, since the defendant "did all he could under the
circumstances.. .17 to file his notice within the time prescribed. Fallen serves
as a prime example of a court's effort to do justice and avoid forfeiture of a
substantial right on technical procedural grounds.'
However, there is another face to the manner in which the courts have
applied rule 37. Although the rule has generally been liberally construed as
is evident in the above-discussed case, the courts have not trifled with the ten-
day requirement and have consistently held that the timely filing of the notice
is essential to the appellate court's jurisdiction. Ordinarily, a court cannot enlarge
the prescribed ten-day limitation even upon a showing that the failure to file
the timely appeal was excusable. The foremost case which illustrates the rigorous
application of rule 37 is United States v. Robinson.1" In Robinson, the defendant
and his attorney each thought that the other was going to file the required notice
of appeal. In addition, the attorney, who had never before taken a criminal ap-
peal, erroneously believed that the time for taking the appeal was thirty days.2"
13 Tillman v. United States, 268 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1959). Rule 4(d) of the Proposed
Uniform Rules of Appellate Procedure stipulates that a motion for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis shall be treated as a notice of appeal. 34 F.R.D. 263 (1964). However, a mere oral
statement made at the time of the sentencing which intimates that the defendant desires to
appeal will not satisfy the rule. Peoples v. United States, 337 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Isabella, 251 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1958).
14 Halfen v. United States, 324 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Quartello,
16 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
15 378 U.S. 139 (1964), reversing 306 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1962).
16 Id. at 144.
17 Ibid.
18 Fallen was presaged by several other liberal cases: see, e.g., Reynolds v. United States,
288 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1961), where the notice of appeal was considered in the constructive
custody of the clerk since it was mailed in time to be delivered to the clerk's office on Satur-
day, a day on which the office was closed; Williams v. United States, 188 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir.
1951); Wallace v. United States, 174 F.2d 112 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 947 (1949).
Four members of the Court concurred in Fallen, but on the grounds that the rule is satis-
fied and the notice is filed when an incarcerated defendant delivers his letter to the prison
authorities. This "constructive filing" would seem to be the reasonable approach, and it has
been adopted in California. People v. Daily, 175 Cal.App.2d 101, 345 P.2d 558 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
19 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
20 Id. at 221, n.1. The attorney failed to distinguish between the rules governing appeals
in civil cases and the rules of criminal procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a) provides that an
appeal may be taken within thirty days of the entry of judgment.
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Hence the appeal was not filed until eleven days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by rule 37. The Court rejected the argument that the time for
taking an appeal could be enlarged if the untimely filing was caused by excusable
neglect and concluded that "the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time
is mandatory and jurisdictional."'"
Manifestly, a requirement which is considered by the Supreme Court as
mandatory and essential to the appellate court's jurisdiction is, notwithstanding
the holding in Fallen, a relatively impliable one. Hence, the concept that the
timely filing of a notice of appeal is "jurisdictional" may prevent a court from
granting relief to an unwary defendant even if it believed that, in the interest
of fairness, it should do so. Thus, the stringent requirement enunciated by
Robinson has sometimes resulted in the loss of the unfortunate defendant's right
to appeal because of the negligence of others. While a defendant cannot lose
his right to appeal because state officials have either actually suppressed his
appeal papers or were negligent in not forwarding them, 2 he can lose his right
because of the negligence of his attorney in not filing the papers within the
prescribed time.24 Thus, an untimely appeal will be dismissed where the defen-
dant has two attorneys, each of whom fails to file the timely notice thinking the
other would fulfill the obligation.25 Similarly, relief has been denied where the
defendant's court-appointed attorney failed to advise his client that the appeal
must be taken within ten days.26 Hence, the existing law presents the somewhat
anomalous situation in which a defendant who is unaided by counsel and who
relies on the prison authorities may be in a better position than the defendant
who justifiably reposes his trust in his attorney to file the appeal.27
A good example of possible injustice through rigorous application of rule
37 is found in the recent Supreme Court case, Berman v. United States.2" In
Berman, the defendant's attorney was taken ill and thus did not file the notice
of appeal until the Monday succeeding the Saturday on which the ten-day
limitation had expired.29 The Court affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal
of the untimely appeal in a per curiam opinion which merely cited Robinson.
In a scathing dissent, in which three other members of the Court concurred,
Mr. Justice Black vigorously objected to the majority's inflexible interpretation
of the rule." He intimated that he considered his brethren's opinion nothing
21 Id. at 229.
22 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 316
U.S. 255 (1942).
23 Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
24 Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1963) (dictum); United States v.
Isabella, 251 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1958) (court indicated that it might be disposed to grant
relief if the rules had an appropriate provision); Dennis v. United States, 177 F.2d 195 (4th
Cir. 1949); United States v. Peabody, 173 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
25 O'Neal v. United States, 264 F.2d 809 '(5th Cir. 1959).
26 United States v. Parker, 208 F. Supp. 920 (D. Mass. 1962).
27 This possibility was mentioned by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Berman
v. United States, 378 U.S. 530, 537 (1964).
28 378 U.S. 530 (1964).
29 The clerk's office was closed on Saturday and Sunday. The defendant's attorney filed
an affidavit stating that he was not aware that the federal courts did not follow the New York
practice of extending the time for appeal until the Monday succeeding the Saturday on which
the normal time limitation expired. Id. at 535.
30 Black's vitriolic dissent is worth noting:
Throughout history men have had to suffer from legal systems which worshipped
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more than a concrete expression of the mistaken "... notion that courts exist
to fashion and preserve rules inviolate instead of to apply those rules to do
justice to litigants."'"
Black's incisive dissent highlights the fact that there are instances in which
an untimely appeal should be considered excusable, and that an opportunity
for relief should be granted rather than leaving the unwary defendant without
a remedy. This suggests that a revision of the rule might be in order if the
primary purpose of procedural rules-to secure an orderly disposition of the
proceeding in accordance with our sense of fair play 2 - is to best be realized.
Evidently the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has recognized this possi-
bility. In the Committee's Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, rule
4(d) provides: "Upoh a showing of excusable neglect the district court may
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days
from the expiration of the original time prescribed. . . ."" Obviously, the
proposed rule will, in many instances, provide a remedy to the deserving defen-
dant who has a meritorious defense; on the other hand, the excusable neglect
provision has disadvantages. Before considering the wisdom of such a rule, it
may prove profitable to scrutinize the manner in which the states have ap-
proached the problem and also to examine the collateral relief that may be
available to a defendant who has failed to file a timely notice of appeal because
of "excusable neglect."
II. State Treatment of the Timely Appeal Problem
While a majority of states allow a longer time within which an appeal
may be taken than the ten days prescribed by the federal rules,3 ' the states
differ in other respects in their treatment of a defendant who, through no fault
of his own, has failed to file a timely appeal. For the purposes of this brief sur-
rigid formalities at the expense of justice. . . . [AJny civilized system of judicial
administration should have enough looseness in the joints to avert gross denials of a
litigant's rights growing out of his lawyer's mistake or even negligence. . . . The
Criminal Rules were framed with the declared purpose of ensuring that justice not
be thwarted by those with too little imagination to see that procedural rules are not
ends in themselves, but simply means to an end: the achievement of equal justice
for all. Id. at 537-38.
31 Id. at 539,
32 FED. R. Cam. P. 2 maintains: "These rules are intended to provide for the just deter-
mination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in pro-
cedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."
33 Proposed Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure, 34 F.R.D. 263 (1964).
34 See: ALA. CODE tit. 15 § 368 (1958) (six months); Amz. R. Caza. P. 348 (sixty
days); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-2701 (repl. vol. 1964) (sixty days); COL. SuP. CT. R. 18 (six
months); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.09 (1941) (ninety days); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2805
(1947) (thirty days); IowA CODE ANN. § 793.2 (1946) (sixty days); MicH. GEN. CT. R.
803 (twenty days); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 632.01 (1945) (six months); MONT. Rv. CoDEs
ANN. § 94-8105 (1947) (six months); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 177.100 (Supp. 1963) (three
months); N.M. SuP. CT. R. 5, §§ 1 and 3 (three months); N.Y. CODE CraM. PRoc. § 521
(thirty days); N.D. CENT. CoDE ANN. § 29-28-08 (1960) (three months); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2953-05 (Page Supp. 1964) (thirty days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1054 (Supp.
1964) (three months); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 53.020 and 157.030 (Supp. 1963) (thirty days) ;
S.D. CODE § 34.4104 (Supp. 1960) (six months); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 827
(1950) (within term of court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-39-5 (1953) (two months); W.VA.
CODE ANN. § 5790 (1961) (eight months); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 958.13 (1958) '(one year);
Wyo. Coiip. STAT. ANN. § 7-292 (1957) (one year).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
vey, and at the risk of overgeneralization, it is best to classify the various state
statutes and rules into three main types: those in which there is no provision
for excusing an untimely appeal; those statutes or rules which allow the court
a large amount of discretion to hear a belated appeal; and those which allow
an untimely appeal, but only under the circumstances specified in the rule or
statute.
A. States in which there is no provision for excusing a belated appeal
A defendant who has failed to file a timely appeal because of excusable
neglect faces an immense obstacle where there is no state statute or rule which
provides for an extension of the time in which an appeal may be taken. Since
the right to appeal is a statutory right, the defendant is obliged to fulfill the
requirements imposed by the statute if he is to secure an appeal. Consequently,
there are innumerable cases in which an untimely appeal has been dismissed
with the mere statement that the period for taking an appeal is mandatory and
the court simply has no jurisdiction to hear a delayed appeal."5 In short, the
time limitation "is binding upon the courts no matter how meritorious the excuse
for failure to appeal in due time." 6
Opposed to this characteristically inflexible approach is State v. Frodsham."7
In this Montana case, the defendant, who had been convicted of kidnapping,
had failed to note a timely appeal because of the negligence of his court-appointed
attorney. Although the court was fully cognizant of the "multitude of decisions
of this court and other courts, state and federal, which hold that appeals not
taken within the statutory time should be dismissed, regardless of the excuse for
the delay,"3 8 it discussed the merits of the appeal. 9 The court reasoned that
elementary justice would not tolerate the deprivation of the defendant's right to
appeal, a loss caused by the inadvertence of an attorney whom the indigent de-
fendant had to accept. While the court's approach is atypical, it certainly
appears to be preferable, at least in the circumstances that existed, to the usual
undeviating insistence on the prescribed time limitation.
B. States which provide a means by which belated appeal may be taken
Several states have promulgated statutes or rules which grant their courts
some discretion to hear a belated appeal.4" For example, a Michigan court rule
provides as follows: "The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant leave to
appeal, upon a showing, supported by affidavit, that there is merit in the claim
35 E.g., State v. Leopard, 191 Kan. 581, 382 P.2d 330 (1963); State v. Morrissey, 259
Minn. 563, 108 N.W.2d 10 (1961) ; Commonwealth v. McKnight, 204 Pa.Super. 313, 204 A.2d
281 (1964).
36 Berkson v. Schneiderman, 280 App.Div. 142, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 88, 89 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
37 362 P.2d 413 (Mont. 1961).
38 Id. at 419.
39 However, Frodsham's contentions were subsequently found to be without merit.
40 E.g., Aruz. SUP. CT. R. 16(a); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2701 (repl. vol. 1964); CAL. 1.
OF CT. 31(a); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3305 (repl. vol. 1956); MioH. GEN. CT. R. 803.3; Mo.
SuP. CT. R. 28.07; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.7 (1955); OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.05
(Page Supp. 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1054 '(Supp. 1964).
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of appeal and that the delay was not due to appellant's culpable negligence.""'
Another approach is exemplified by an Ohio statute which provides that after
the usual thirty-day time limitation for the taking of appeals has expired, an
".... appeal may be taken only by leave of the court to which the appeal is
taken. '42 Statutes and rules of this variety may eliminate the unfairness which
can result if the usual statutory time limitation for the taking of an appeal is
rigorously applied, regardless of the defendant's excuse. The courts in a state
which has such a provision obviously enjoy a large amount of discretion. How-
ever, the cases indicate that these various courts are not in agreement as to why
and when the discretion should be exercised in favor of the defendant. For
instance, in Indiana, a court may sustain a motion for a belated appeal if the
defendant can show sufficient cause to excuse the delay in noting the appeal.4 3
However, the negligence of an attorney in not ascertaining the time for an
appeal has been considered an insufficient cause for excusing the delay.44
Similarly, a delay caused by a misunderstanding between the defendant's two
counsel has not been regarded as an adequate cause for allowing the belated
appeal.4 On the other hand, the Arizona Supreme Court has found that the
negligence of the defendant's attorney is an appropriate reason for granting an
appeal which was not noted within the prescribed period.46 Moreover, unlike
Indiana, the California Supreme Court has liberally construed its rule which
confers on the appellate courts power to grant relief from late filing.47 The
defendant is given the benefit of any doubt that might exist as to the reason
for the failure to appeal and the court has stated that it will grant relief from
the late filing of the notice simply "as a matter of policy." 4 Hence, a delayed
appeal will be granted if the delay resulted from the failure, apparently without
excuse, of the appellant's attorney.49
It is difficult to appraise the success or advisability of these statutes or rules
which provide for belated appeals. However, the California cases would seem
to indicate that the desired goal of preventing the forfeiture of substantial rights
on technical grounds can be achieved without unduly sacrificing the equally
desirable goals of a prompt disposition of the case and judicial economy.
41 MIcr. GEN. CT. R. 803.3.
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.05 (Page Supp. 1964).
43 State ex tel. Casey v. Murray, 231 Ind. 74, 106 N.E.2d 911 (1952).
44 Barker v. State, 242 Ind. 5, 175 N.E.2d 353 (1961).
45 Harrell v. State, 239 Ind. 336, 157 N.E.2d 581 (1959).
46 State v. Schroeder, 95 Ariz. 255, 389 P.2d 255 (1964).
47 CAL. R. OF CT. 31(a) provides:
Whenever a notice of appeal is received by the clerk of the superior court
after the expiration of the period prescribed for filing such notice, the clerk shall
mark it "Received (date) but not filed" and advise the party seeking to file the
notice that it was received but not fied because the period for filing notice of appeal
had elapsed and that he may petition the reviewing court for relief by verified state-
ment or declaration under penalty or perjury, setting forth the date of the order or
judgment from which the party seeks to appeal, the steps which the party took to file
his notice of appeal on time, and any other information which has, or which the
party believes has, a bearing upon the circumstances which caused the notice of
appeal to arrive late.
48 People v. Tucker, 40 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612, 395 P.2d 449, 452 '(1964).
49 People v. Diehl, 41 Cal. Rptr. 281, 396 P.2d 697 (1964); People v. Flanagan, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 396 P.2d 389 (1964); People v. Casillas, 38 Cal. Rptr. 721, 392 P.2d 521 (1964).
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C. States which provide for a belated appeal in specified circumstances
A possible middle ground between the practice of dismissing all untimely
appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay, and the rules or statutes which
give the courts a large amount of discretion, is to allow the filing of an untimely
appeal only when the circumstances specified in the enabling statute exist. The
state of New York, where an appeal ordinarily must be taken within thirty days,
has such a rule;"0 if the defendant's attorney dies or is suspended within the
thirty-day period, an appeal may be taken within sixty days of the date on
which the misfortune occurred. Also, if the attorney becomes physically in-
capacitated, the court may, in its discretion, honor the application for a late
appeal.
A rule or statute which specifically limits the circumstances in which a
court may hear an untimely appeal has obvious disadvantages as well as ad-
vantages. While such a rule diminishes the possibility of frequent fabrications
of fictitious claims, it also increases the possibility that a defendant who has a
meritorious claim will be left without a remedy after his, or his attorney's, pro-
cedural default which is not within the excuses specified in the statute. It is
submitted that it is unwise to attempt to categorize all the reasons which are
sufficient cause for allowing a belated appeal. The flexibility which may be
required to do justice in a particular situation is best provided by allowing the
court itself to determine whether the circumstances are such that the delay
should be considered excusable.
III. Collateral Review
A. Postconviction remedies for state prisoners
Invariably, a timely appeal which provides an orderly and prompt dis-
position of the controversy, is the correct mode of review. It is an oft-repeated
statement that a writ of habeas corpus cannot supplant an appeal;"1 collateral
remedies are reserved for the exceptional cases. However, in certain instances,
a defendant who has failed to file a timely appeal and who has a claim of con-
stitutional proportions may secure relief through the postconviction remedies
provided by the state. For example, a defendant may secure a writ of habeas
corpus" or coram nobis5s when his appeal papers have been unconstitutionally
suppressed by prison authorities. The maxim that habeas corpus is not a sub-
50 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 521-a (1958), provides:
If an attorney dies, is removed or suspended within the time fixed by law to take
an appeal . . ., such notice may be served within sixty days from the date of death,
removal or suspension. If any attorney becomes mentally or physically incapacitated
within the time fixed by law to take an appeal, without having served a notice of
appeal, the court whose determination is sought to be reviewed, upon application
made within sixty days from the date of the commencement of each incapacity may,
in its discretion, and upon such terms as it may direct, permit such notice to be
served.
51 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947);
State ex rel. Risatti v. Eaton, -161 So.2d 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Commonwealth ex
rel. Davis v. Russell, 415 Pa. 119, 202 A.2d 306 (1964).
52 Beard v. Warden, 211 Md. 658, 128 A.2d 426 (1957).
53 People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77, 176 N.E.2d 90 (1961). In People
v. Hill, 8 N.Y.2d 935, 204 N.Y.S.2d 172, 168 N.E.2d 841 (1960) the court utilized coram nobis
to provide relief for a defendant who was insane during the time required for taking the appeal.
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stitute for appeal is obviously not applicable in these situations where the cause
of the failure to appeal is a constitutional infirmity. 4 Also, a few courts have
gone so far as to provide collateral relief where the defendant has been deprived
of his right to an appeal because of the failure of his attorney to note his appeal.5
For example, in Ex parte Caldwell,56 the defendant had failed to fie a timely
appeal because of the mistake of his inexperienced attorney. His appeal was
therefore dismissed as untimely; yet the Texas court granted his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
However, a defendant who has failed to file a timely appeal ordinarily
will not be able to secure relief through his state's postconviction procedure.
The convicted defendant is confronted with the principle that habeas corpus
is not a substitute for a timely appeal, and he must show that his claim is one
which the postconviction procedure will recognize. Hence, his ability to utilize
the collateral approach will depend upon the literal scope of the state's remedy
and whether the court is at all reluctant to liberally construe or expand the
remedy. It is beyond the purpose of this note to review the breadth of the
various states' postconviction remedies. Suffice to say that the diverse state
procedures have been condemned as being too limited in scope, excessive in num-
ber, or too conservatively construed by the state courts.57 In short, the state
postconviction remedies have generally been criticized as inadequate to provide
relief in all the circumstances in which fundamental justice demands relief. For
example, a typical state postconviction remedy may still be restricted to instances
where the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
crime charged or imposed an excessive sentence." Obviously, a remedy of such
a limited scope cannot satisfy the expanding requirements of fairness imposed
by the fourteenth amendment and therefore affords no aid to the defendant
who has failed to file a timely notice of appeal although he may have a claim
of constitutional proportions.
The failure of the states to develop postconviction remedies adequate to
protect a prisoner's constitutional rights has necessitated, or at least stimulated,
frequent resort to federal habeas corpus proceedings. The federal writ of habeas
corpus, or as it is frequently termed, "the Great Writ,"59 permits a federal court
to order discharge of any prisoner who is detained by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws."° Either as a principle of comity or judicial economy,
54 The Supreme Court has held that suppression of appeal papers by prison authorities is
unconstitutional. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 '(1951); Cochran v.
Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942). Habeas corpus has also been provided when the prison official
had merely neglected to mail the appeal papers. State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So.2d 518
(Fla. 1964); Burke v. State, 160 So.2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
55 State v. Shoemaker, 225 Md. 639, 171 A.2d 468 (1961).
56 383 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Crim.-App. 1964).
57 See, e.g., Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961).
58 E.g., COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65-1-3 (1963). See Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in
Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 RocKY MT. L. Ray. 249 (1959).
59 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 passim (1963).
60 The statutory provisions on habeas corpus for state prisoners appear in 28 U.S.C. §§
2241-2254. § 2241(c) provides: "The wait of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless - .. . (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States ... "
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various limitations have been imposed on the availability of the writ to a state
prisoner, but it is now clear that the writ may be available to such prisoner who
has a claim of constitutional magnitude, even though he failed to appeal his state
conviction. The Supreme Court's decision in Fay v. Noia,6 ' establishes this
proposition. In Fay, the state prisoner was convicted of murder on evidence
consisting of coerced confessions. After consultation with his counsel Noia
decided not to appeal, mainly because of his apprehension that a death sen-
tence would be imposed on retrial. Years later, Noia attempted to secure his
release by means of his state's postconviction remedies but relief was denied
because of his failure to appeal. 2 Noia then petitioned for a writ of federal
habeas corpus.6 The significant holding of the Supreme Court is contained
in its statement that ". . . jurisdiction of the federal courts on habeas corpus is
not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the state
court proceeding .. ."64 The Court adhered to the classic definition of waiver
- an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege'
- and concluded that Noia had not waived his constitutional claim by his
failure to appeal in the state courts. The federal courts may refuse a petition
for the writ when the state prisoner deliberately bypasses the orderly state pro-
cedure but, in the words of the Court, a deliberate bypassing is effected only by
the "considered choice of the petitioner."66
This brief recital of Fay v. Noia is sufficient to expose its implications as
to the subject here under discussion. A defendant who had failed to file a timely
appeal because of excusable neglect certainly could not be said to have made a
"considered choice." Hence, the federal courts must entertain his petition. In
short, a federal forum is available to every state prisoner who alleges that he
has suffered an unconstitutional state conviction even though he had inadver-
tently failed to file a timely notice of appeal in the state court.
B. Collateral relief for federal prisoners under 28 USC 2255
The Fay v. Noia decision on availability of federal habeas corpus is not
confined to state prisoners; its implications also extend to the availability of the
writ, or its statutory counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to federal prisoners. Section
2255, for all practical purposes, has replaced and is the equivalent of the writ of
habeas corpus for federal prisoners." Section 2255 provides a collateral remedy
61 372 U.S. 391 (1963). This case involves immense implications in state-federal rela-
tions and thus has been a fertile source for law review commentaries. See, e.g., Note, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 78 (1964);
Symposium, Habeas Corpus - Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REV. 18 (1964); 12 KAN.
L. REV. 557 (1964); 9 VILL. L. REV. 168 (1963).
62 Noia first sought to utilize the states' remedy of coram nobis. Coram nobis was denied
in 3 N.Y.2d 596, 148 N.E.2d 139, 170 N.Y.S.2d 799, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 905 (1958).
63 Federal habeas corpus was denied in 183 F.Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 300
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
64 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
65 Id. at 439. This definition was first 'enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938).
66 Id. at 439.
67 Under § 2255, a federal court cannot entertain a habeas corpus petition of a federal
prisoner unless the motion procedure of § 2255 is inadequate to test the validity of the peti-
tioner's confinement.
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for a prisoner who is sentenced by a federal court in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States' just as the federal writ of habeas corpus provides a
similar remedy to a state prisoner who is unconstitutionally confined in a state
prison. Since Fay decided that a state prisoner is not deprived of the collateral
remedy of federal habeas corpus when he has suffered an "abortive state proceed-
ing,"69 the question arises whether a federal prisoner, who has endured a similar
procedural default in a federal court, should not be able to secure similar relief
under § 2255. Admittedly, the underlying considerations in Fay v. Noia vary
somewhat from the issues involved in the problem of whether collateral relief
should be available to a federal prisoner who had failed to file a timely notice of
appeal. A prominent consideration in Fay, which is not present in the case of a
federal prisoner, was the desirability of providing a federal forum for the federal
question. On the other hand, a case involving a federal rather than a state prisoner
does not present the grave peril of "disrupting the delicate balance of federalism so
foremost in the minds of the Founding Fathers and so uniquely important in the
field of law enforcement.""0 However, the same ultimate question is present in
each case: whether a person who has failed to assert his constitutional claim on
appeal because of his procedural default should be precluded from collateral relief.
In Fay, the Court asserted that a state prisoner's procedural default would not pre-
clude his resort to federal habeas corpus unless the failure to appeal was the "con-
sidered choice" of the defendant; this same controlling standard would seem to be
equally applicable to the federal prisoner. Thus, it would be logically incon-
sistent to deny a federal prisoner collateral relief when he has inadvertently
failed to note his appeal within the prescribed time if a similar forfeiture doctrine
does not burden the state prisoner.
There is some authority for the contention that one who has a constitu-
tional claim may secure a § 2255 hearing, notwithstanding his excusable failure
to note a timely appeal.71 Indeed, in United States v. Robinson,"2 the case most
68 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The section provides in part:.
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
The dominant purpose of § 2255 was to relieve the district court where federal penitentiaries
are located from the burden of all the habeas corpus petitions filed by the prisoners. For an
excellent review of the purposes and effectiveness of § 2255 see Smith, Title 28, Section 2255
of the United States Code-Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence: Effective or
Ineffective Aid to a Federal Prisoner? 40 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 171 (1965). See also Note,
Procedural Substitute for Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis and Comparison, 34 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 81 (1959); Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of
Habeas Corpus, 59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950).
69 This descriptive term has been applied to state cases dismissed because of such pro-
cedural defaults as failure to file timely notice of appeal. The term was evidently originated
by Professor Reitz. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact on an Abortive State Pro-
ceeding, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1315 (1961).
70 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 (1963) dissenting opinion.
71 It should be emphasized that Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139 (1961) is not, as
some have believed, accurate authority for the contention that § 2255 is an inappropriate
remedy for a defendant who excusably failed to file his appeal within the ten-day limitation.
In Hodges the Court did not actually reach the question whether collateral relief could be
secured when the federal prisoner has a claim of constitutional dimension and failed to timely
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frequently cited for the proposition that excusable neglect will not justify a
belated appeal, the Court expressly noted that a § 2255 hearing may be avail-
able to rectify a denial of a basic constitutional right." Also, shortly after Fay
the Ninth Circuit 4 examined that decision's implications as to the availability of
a § 2255 hearing for a federal prisoner, who alleged that perjured testimony was
used against him and also that he lost his right to appeal only because his
counsel failed to follow his instructions. Evidently, the Court thought that col-
lateral relief could be available since it remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the defendant had in fact intentionally relinquished his
right to appeal, and if he had suffered any prejudice in not securing a review.
Subsequently, Mr. Justice Black persuasively contended in his dissenting opinion
in Berman that the petitioner, who had alleged a constitutional infirmity in his
conviction, could assert his rights in a § 2255 hearing. The Justice cogently
reasoned that if Noia could secure relief despite his failure to appeal it would
be "unthinkable that the same rule should not be applied in federal courts so
as to grant relief to a defendant who has been denied a federally guaranteed
right because of his failure to comply.. ." with the ten-day rule."
Therefore, it appears that a defendant who has a claim that is cognizable
in a § 2255 hearing may secure relief under that section even though he had
failed to appeal because of excusable neglect. Manifestly, if the defendant, who
has inadvertently failed to appeal is to secure collateral relief under § 2255 he
must have a constitutional claim which is within the scope of, or is cognizable in,
such a proceeding. As mentioned above, the scope of collateral review under
§ 2255 is comparable to the scope of habeas corpus:" both remedies are de-
signed to provide relief from deprivations of a constitutional right. If the de-
fendant does not have a claim of constitutional magnitude he will probably not
be able to secure collateral relief; the remedy was not intended, nor is it allowed,
to serve as an appeal. 7 However the Court has never attempted to enumerate
the instances in which § 2255 relief may be granted. Therefore, the question
arises whether an attorney's willful or negligent failure to note a timely appeal
could be such a denial of effective assistance of counsel as to be, in itself, a
constitutional infirmity and therefore cognizable in a § 2255 hearing. At first
glance, the question appears frivolous. The right to appeal is not essential to
due process78 and, while incompetence of counsel may, in rare instances, be
note his appeal. The defendant asserted that his confession was secured because of an illegal
detention and that he should have been accorded a § 2255 hearing regardless of his failure to
appeal. The Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, evidently because the records
of the case showed that there was not an unlawful detention and not because of the defendant's
failure to appeal. See 60 MicH. L. REv. 1168 (1962).
72 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
73 Id. at 230, n. 14. See Hixon v. United States, 268 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1959).
74 Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1963).
75 Berman v. United States, 378 U.S. 530, 532 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
76 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); United States v. Meyers, 84 F.Supp.
766 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982 (1950).
77 Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139, 141 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
78 Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930). Despite
the fact that appeal has not been given the dignity of a due process-protected right, it has, as
was noted at the outset, been given an increasingly important position in the administration of
criminal justice. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
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grounds for reversal,"' the requirements of the sixth amendment would have
to be extensively expanded if the mere failure to take a timely appeal could be
considered a deprivation of the defendant's constitutional rights and thus cogni-
zable in a §, 2255 hearing. Nevertheless, several recent cases have encountered the
question of whether the attorney's failure to file a timely appeal is, in itself, a
sufficient reason for allowing a § 2255 proceeding. In none of these cases did
the court discuss the availability of a § 2255 hearing in terms of whether the
deprivation of the defendant's right to an appeal presented a constitutional
infirmity, and would thus be within the traditional scope of the remedy. Rather,
the courts have apparently accepted the idea that the remedy provides some
flexibility and can be molded to rectify serious wrongs whether or not the error
has heretofore been considered of constitutional proportions. Several courts
have absolutely rejected the argument that a § 2255 hearing is available upon
a mere showing of neglect of counsel"0 or on the sole ground that the attorney,
contrary to the defendant's instructions, had failed to note an appeal." A few
courts have intimated that the failure of the defendant's attorney might be a
sufficient denial of effective assistance and cognizable in a § 2255 hearing,
but only if there was plain reversible error in the trial 2 Finally, the First and
Seventh Circuits have provided relief to an unwary defendant where there were
indications that his attorney had actually deceived him into believing that an
appeal had been noted." The First Circuit's opinion in Desmond v. United
States4 is worthy of a brief analysis. The court recognized that § 2255 was
not intended to serve as a substitute for an appeal; yet it also realized that the
remedy is a flexible one, capable of rectifying a denial of basic rights. It
persuasively reasoned that because of the undeniable importance of the right
of appeal, and the implications of Fay, a defendant who had lost his appeal
because of the deception of his counsel was entitled to a § 2255 hearing."5
It is not the purpose of this note to attempt to assay the wisdom of ex-
panding the traditional scope of the collateral remedy so as to include the de-
privation of the right to appeal which results when an unscrupulous or negligent
attorney fails to file a timely appeal. However, these cases illustrate the increas-
ing importance the courts have attached to the right to appeal, and their
reluctance to withlold all remedies from one who has, through no fault of his
79 Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943). iBut the incompetency of counsel
will rarely be considered a violation of due process. See Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1944).
80 Dennis v. United States, 177 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Peabody, 173
F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
81 Wilson v. United States, 338 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Carrell, 231 F.
Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1964), where the court intimated that§ 2255 could not be used to provide
relief if the defendant's counsel did not file his appeal within the appropriate time even though
the Court of Appeals had previously remanded the case to 'the court to determine whether the
defendant actually had informed his attorney to file the appeal. Carrellv. United States, 335
F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The action of the Court of Appeals seems 'to pmply that it consid-
ered § 2255 an appropriate means of relief.
82 Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. United States, 254
F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
83 Desmond v. United States, 333 F.2d 378 (Ist Cir. 1964); Calland v. tUnited States, 323
F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1963). This court did not specifically mention the, remedy which was avail-
able but presumably it was a § 2255 hearing.
84 Desmond v. United States, supra note 83.
85 Id. at 380.
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own, lost this right. Most importantly, cases such as Desmond furnish a per-
suasive reason for the adoption of a provision which would allow a belated
appeal in instances where the appeal was not filed within the prescribed time
because of excusable neglect. This "persuasive reason" is simply that these cases
might not have arisen if an "excusable neglect" rule had existed. The de-
fendant's claim would be promptly decided in the belated appeal and resort
to collateral relief would be unnecessary.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In order to examine the problem of balancing the interest in securing a
finis to the litigation with fair treatment of the defendant who has failed to note
a timely appeal, one must consider the present practices of the courts when
confronted with an untimely petition for an appeal, and the collateral relief
which may be available if the belated appeal is denied. As we have seen, both
the federal courts and courts of states which do not have a statutory provision
governing an excusable delay generally dismiss any untimely appeal, regardless
of the cause for the delay. 6 The defendant then may attempt to secure relief
through a collateral remedy. A state prisoner may pursue his state's postcon-
viction remedy, but oftentimes the remedy is not of sufficient scope to rectify
even the constitutional infirmities of his conviction ;"7 therefore, the state prisoner
may be compelled to resort to the federal writ of habeas corpus. If the state
prisoner has a claim of constitutional magnitude, he will not be deprived of
the writ simply because he had unwittingly failed to file a timely notice of
appeal in the state court."5 A federal prisoner who has a constitutional claim
and who has lost his right to appeal because of laxity in noting his appeal can
probably secure collateral relief in a § 2255 hearing."9 While the mere fact that
the defendant has lost his right to appeal because of his attorney's negligence
is not a sufficient reason for resort to the extraordinary remedy,9" recent cases
indicate that § 2255 is an appropriate means of relief for a defendant who was
fraudulently deprived of his right to appeal by his attorney.9
In view of these facts, one can advance a persuasive argument that both
the federal and the state rules should provide for an extension of the period in
which an appeal may be filed when excusable neglect was the cause for the
delay. Such a provision will frequently eliminate the use of the more circuitous
collateral remedies and, obviously, an appeal is the preferred and most ap-
propriate mode of review. An "excusable neglect" provision will also aid the
defendant who has a meritorious claim which could be rectified on appeal but
which is not within the scope of the more limited collateral remedies. It would
seem difficult to argue that, regardless of the cause of the failure to note a timely
appeal, the defendant should be deprived of his only opportunity to correct the
errors that may have been committed. The loss of the right to appeal is a sub-
86 See text accompanying notes 19-31 and 35-36 supra.
87 See text accompanying notes 51-58 supra.
88 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see text accompanying notes 60-66 supra.
89 See text accompanying notes 68-75 supra.
90 See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
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stantial one; to lose it because of circumstances beyond the defendant's control
arouses a sense of injustice.
Admittedly, one can also assert valid arguments against the adoption of
an "excusable neglect" provision. It is possible that such a rule would be grossly
abused by the fabrication of a multitude of spurious claims. Prisoners who have
lost their right to appeal can be expected to conjure up ingenious excuses for
their failure to note a timely appeal, and may not hesitate to embarrass the respon-
sible attorney by falsely accusing him of negligence. 2 Indeed, it has been inti-
mated that the proposed provision would unseal the proverbial Pandora's box.93
However, there are numerous factors which may deter abuse of an "excusable
neglect" rule. We can rely to some extent on the ability of a court to expose
and to ferret out the fictitious claims. Also, the defendant must prove both
that the failure to note the appeal was not of his doing, and that sufficient grounds
for an appeal exist. Finally, a reasonable time limitation within which the de-
layed appeal may be recognized can be established. Such a time limitation is
probably a necessity even though in rare instances it may prevent a defendant,
who has a meritorious claim and who does in fact have a valid excuse for his
failure to file the appeal, from securing relief. 4
The problem of balancing the interests of prompt criminal administration
and finality of litigation and the sometimes competing interest of assuring that
justice has been done is not susceptible to an invulnerable solution. Panaceas
are not easily achieved where important but inconsistent interests are involved.
It is submitted, however, that a provision permitting a belated appeal where the
failure to note the appeal within the time prescribed was caused by excusable
neglect is a sufficiently practicable one. The provision properly sacrifices ex-
pediency in the interest of promoting the courts' dominant purpose of doing
justice and, therefore, is preferable to the procrustean practice of refusing an
untimely appeal, regardless of the cause of the delay.
MICHAEL J. SCHIIMERG
92 See, e.g., Peoples v. United States, 337 F.2d 91 (10th 'Cir. 1964); United States v.
Carrell, 231 F. Supp. 724 (D.D.C. 1964).
93 United States v. Carrell, supra note 86 at 728.
94 A defendant, who excusably failed to file his appeal even within the extended time
period, could conceivably resort to the collateral remedies.
